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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
vV"Il.JLIA~I

K. HOvVARD, RUTH N.
HOvVARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD,
AND SHIRLEY L. HOWARD,
Plain tiffs-Respondents,

-vs.MILDRED M. HOWARD,
Defendant-Appellant,
~I lLDRED

l\L HOWARD,
Defendant-and Third Party
P la ~1ntiff-A pp~ellant,

Case No.
No. 9552

-vs.\VALKER BANK & TRUST COMpANY, as Administrator of the estate
of L. \V-. Howard, deceased, WILLLA.~I K. HOvVARD, RUTH N.
HO\\r ARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD
and SHIRLEY L. HO\VARD,
Third Party Defendants-Respondents.

PETITION" OF
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FOR RE-HEARING
.A.ND BRIEF

The defendant and appellant respectfully requests a
rehearing in the above entitled case upon the following
grounds:
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE
FACTS A GRANT IS NOT SUSTAINABLE.
POINT 2.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT IS EITHER
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT HOWARD HAD IN
MIND, OR CONJECTURE INDULGED, ONE WOULD HAVE
TO DIVINE TH.NT ANY NUMBER OF AREAS COULD BE
SAID TO HAVE BEEN INTE-NDED.
POINT 3.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ABSTRACTORS AND LAWYERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO TURN DOWN
A TITLE BASED ON THE CONTENTIONS OF SUCH AN
ASSERTED ILLU-SIONARY INTENTION O·F A DECEASED.
POINT 4.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE LAST
STATEMENTS IN THE DESCRIPTION AND IN TREATING
THE SAME AS CALLS WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE REJECTED THE SAME AS BElNG CUMUL.NTIVE AND NOT A PART
OF THE DESCRIPTION.
POINT 5.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPERTY WHICH APPELLANT CON'TENDS WAS INTENDED
TO BE DESCRIBED CONTAINS CLOSE TO FIVE ACRES.
POINT 6.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REMAND THE
CASE TO 'THE TRIAL COURT WHERE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED TO EXPLAIN THE INTENT OF THE GRANTOR.
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3
Al{U lJl\TENT
POINT 1.
THE COUR'T ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UNDER THE
FACTS A GRANT IS NOT SUSTAINABLE.

It is recognized that the description contained in the
deed here in question as it no\v stands is not a perfect
description. This is the reason appellant filed her
counter-action in this case, for refonnation of the deed.
There is an obvious omission in the description but the
deed affords sufficient data to permit the omission to be
supplied in aid of the description as given.
The authorities are to the effect that if the description as given sufficiently supplies the means of identifying the land to be conveyed, then it is valid and reformation is proper. Here the deed in question does just that,
it supplies the means for identification. In comparing
the description in the questioned deed as far as it is given,
\\?ith the original deed by \vhich the grantor acquired
the tract of \vhich this is a part, the data contained in
the questioned deed sho\\Ts definitely that the grantor
intended to ronvey that tract, less tracts A and B, contained '"·ithin the line dra\vn around tracts A and B, and
excluding tract X. l\f r. Ho\vard states that it is a tract
including tracts A and B, and then he excepts those two
tracts. The reference to tracts A and B alone identifies
the land intended to be conveyed. To hold other\\~ise is
contrary to that n1le of law announcing that every deed
ought to be so construed that the intent of the parties
may prevail and not be defeated. A line running NorthSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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erly and Southerly cannot be injected into the description
at any place "':hich runs between tracts A and B, because
Howard definitely locates the lines around these two
tracts. But the court says by this decision that it cannot
tell where Howard intended to locate the property.
It is difficult to conceive of a deed not complete, more
definitely supplying the means for identification than in
this case. Here Mr. Howard definitely locates the tract
owned by him in the proper quarter section. He ties into
the proper corner. He definitely locates the beginning
point, then definitely describes five difficult courses, all
but the closing one. The furnishing of one line from the
termini of Howards last call to the place of beginning encloses a tract of land owned by the grantor.
Appellant is entitled to have applied, reasonable
rules of construction, aided by extrinsic evidence, to
identify the property.
POINT 2.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT IS EI'THER
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT HOWARD HAD IN
MIND, OR CONJECTURE INDULGED, ONE WOULD HAVE
TO DIVINE THAT ANY NUMBER OF AREAS COULD BE
SAID TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED.

As \Ye have stated under point 1, the description
as given clearly sho"Ts the intention of the grantor to
cover that land of \Yhirh the theatre tract "A," and''; ood
tract, '' B" were a part. Tracts A and B are located in
opposite corners of the area described, they are included
in the de~eription and these tracts being excepted it is
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evident l\lr. lloward intended to convey that land which
lies between the1n, no other construction is possible.
The grantor does not say 2.75 acres more or less of a
tract \vithin the perimeter of that part of the description
given, the 1neets and bounds description is first given,
and then it is followed by the words ''containing 2.75
acres 1nore or less.'' For the court to s.ay the grantor
might have intended to convey some indefinite 2.75 acres
of a larger tract, requires the placing of the importance
of the reference to acreage ahead of the meets and bounds
description as given, such is not a fair construction of
the deed. The reference to the acreage is but in aid of
the description, to show that the grantor intended to
convey a large tract and not a small one. It cannot be
said, \vhere the four sides of the property are enclosed by
a described line or call, that these calls can be ignored and
the acreage controls, especially when the acreage is followed by the words "more or less"; the law is just the
opposite; where calls are given, they control. See Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed., Vol. 6, Sec. 3345 statIng:
~·The most n1aterial and particular part of the
description controls that which is less natural
and certain. A description by metes and bounds
controls a statement of the quantity, unless a contrary intention appears in the deed."
POINT 3.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ABSTRACTORS AND LAWYERS SHOULD BE ABLE 'TO TURN DOWN
A TITLE BASED ON THE CONTENTIONS OF SUCH AN
ASSERTED ILLUSIONARY INTENTION O·F A DECEASED.
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It is recognized that abstractors and lawyers in examining titles accept documents as they appear of record.
Abstractors compiling an abstract show those documents
affecting the title as given, and examining attorneys
rely on the documents as abstracted. Neither are required
to determine from the documents what the intent of the
party or parties executing the same was. In order to perfect the instrument making up the title, where an omission
is apparent, and where a grantor such as in this case is
deceased, the courts are the only ones empowered to
supply an omission. True abstractors and la-\\ryers may
turn down titles where imperfect descriptions are contained in instruments making up the title but that does
not mean the instrument cannot be reformed. Reformation is the equitable procedure available to those affected
by discrepancies in deeds.
This reasoning has no bearing on the question
whether the deed contains sufficient data to permit the
omission to be supplied.
POINT 4.
'THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE LAST
STATEMENTS IN THE DESCRIPTION AND IN TREATING
THE SAME AS CALLS WHEN IT SHOULD HAVE REJECTED THE SAME AS BEING CUlVIULA'TIVE AND NOT A PART
OF THE DESCRIPTION.

As pointed out in appellanfs original brief, Devlin
states that a deed is not void for uncertainty because
there may be errors or an inconsistency in some of the
particulars. If the land conveyed can be identified by
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the other eal.ls of the dl~scription an impossible or senseless course \viii not be considered. Here the land can be
identified by the five calls of the description.
rrhis court says in its opinion as rendered:
Ho,vard failed to close the fifth and sixth
courses in the abortive deed, and he tangentially
de~eribed a course reflected in the dotted line on
Figure 2, coursing counter-clockwise instead of
clock\\ri.se and commencing from the real point of
beginning to the target which he described as a
point 'from beginning,' \vhich makes no sense."
H

As heretofore stated, that part of the description
\vhich makes no sense expresses nothing more than the
grantors intention to locate the termni of the fifth call,
it is not a call nor is it a p~art of the description and it was
not intended to be. The location of the fifth call is definite and its length is given, Mr. Howard having particularly described the bearing and distance of the fifth call
thusly: ""N 46°25' W --t-04 ft more or less,'' this is the
end of the call of the description, from then on the
intent \\'"as to locate the termni of the fifth call with reference to the place of beginning, this added nothing, and
therefore the use of the words, "from beginning" should
not be confusing. In fact this part of the deed should not
be taken into consideration at all under those authorities
cited by appellant in her brief; without considering the
above mentioned words, all that is needed to n1ake the
description complete is to draw a line from the termni
of the fifth call as given, to the place of beginning, in so
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doing it \vould enclose a tract of land which evidence will
show was owned by Mr. Howard at the time he made the
deed.
Not only did appellant point out in her brief, the law
as announced in Devlin on this subject but we also quoted
from Thompson on Real Property, stating, after an accurate description, an inaccurate description following
which is merely cumulative \vill be rejected.
The court says the Losee case cited by appellant is
complimented by the phrase "'to the place of beginning.''
While appellant is mindful of that fact our reason for
relying on the Losee case as authority is because this
court therein cited Patton on Titles, Sec. 7-i, p. 365 stating the foil owing :
''even "Then the lines are continuous they
may fail to enclose any tract owing to failure of
the final line to return to the starting point."
The Losee case also cites Ransberry v. Broadhead,
17 -i Atl. 97 in which case the deed did not recite "to the
place of beginning." It is presumed fron1 the above statement and cases cited in the Losee case that this court
'viii not hold any description inoperative simply because
the last course is not given or that the words '•to the
place of beginning" are omitted.
POINT 5.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT T'HE PROPERTY WHICH APPELLANT CONTENDS WAS INTENDED
ro BE DESCRIBED CONTAINS CLOSE TO FIVE ACRES.
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.Appellant critcised respondent for injecting into
their brief statements not in evidence, for this reason appellant did not think it proper to brief and argue facts
not in evidence.
If appellant 'vere afforded the opportunity to introduce extrinsic evidence in this case the evidence would
show that the property is located on Holladay Boulevard,
that the description of the tract runs to the centre
of the street, that the street is a four rod wide street and
that the frontage along this boulevard runs 6.15 chains,
causing approximately .3 acre of the prop·erty described
to be in Holladay Boulevard. That is the reason the
grantor excepted the roads in his deed.
Evidence will further show why the grantor intended
to exclude from the description that tract at the southwesterly corner, marked by this court as tract X; this
tract contains in excess of one acre. It is evident from
the original deed that the whole of the tract acquired
by the grantor contained but 6.58 acres.
As stated in point 2, l\Ir. Howard having located all
but the closing call of the tract by a meets and bounds
description the reference to acreage is but cumulative
and descriptive, it is not controlling. It is apparent the
grantor did not know just what the property contained
in acreage, his reason for referring to it as 2. 75 acres
more or less. It is conceded that had the grantor but
said 2.75 acres more or less of the tract owned by him
in the N\V~lt of SEll! of Sec. 10, T. 2 S., R. 1 E., "~ithout
further indentifying the tract, the grant "\Yould be so inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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definite and uncertain that it would not be possible to
know what 2.75 acres was intended, but that is not this
case, here the grantor first used the meets and bounds
calls of the description, which is controlling.
POINT 6.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REMAND THE
CASE TO 'THE TRIAL CO·URT WHERE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED TO EXPLAIN THE INTEN·T OF THE GRANTOR.

The court in its opinion states:
"It is significant that after the execution of
the disputed deed, Ho,vard executed another one
in favor of 1Irs. Howard, covering an area near
Tract A, but much smaller, 'vhich deed seems op~er
ative and accepted as an effective conveyance.''
The lower court having granted judg1nent on the
pleadings, appellant 'vas not afforded the opportunity
to explain why the deed herein 'Yas given. If the case had
been tried this could have been explained. Therefore it is
unfair at this stage of the case to give any significance
to this act on the part of !ir. Howard.
It is further evident from the record of the case as it
no'v stands that appellant, if given the opportunity to
present her case could produce an engineer 'vho "~ould
testify that he could locate the property by the description. This court 'vholly overlooks the la'v announced in
the cases cited by appellant in her brief as to this point.
Here ,ye have a description sufficient in itself to identify
the land, and appellant is entitled to introduce extrinsic
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evidence for the purpose of applying the description to
the surface of the earth and thus identify it with the tract
in controversy. The defect in the deed is not a patent defect. There i~ sufficient data included in the deed when
placed side by side with the deed by which Howard acquired title to the original tract, to show intent, and appellant is entitled to introduce evidence in aid of the
description. That evidence must of course, be competent
evidence and the trial court will require competent evidence.
vVhile \Ve are mindful of the fact that parol evidence
is not admissible to enlarge the terms of the writte·n instrument or to add to it, still the authorities hold that
parol evidence is always admissible in aid of application
of the description to its subject matter. Here as heretofore pointed out, ~Ir. Howard followed difficult courses
with particularity enclosing a tract of land which he
owned ; there could be no tract othe.r than that which
appellant contends was intended to be conveyed; e.vidence
will show that the tract described is all that Mr. Howard
had in that area which had not been conveyed, this is
important to ap·pellant's case.
Devlin says great liberality is always exercised in
constructing that part of the deed in which the property
conveyed is described and the description will be sufficient if it supplies the means for identifying the land
to be conveyed.
This Honorable court has in numerous decisions
where summary judgments have been granted by the
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lower court, reversed the same and has remanded the case
to the trial court ; this on the ground that all inferences
must be resolved in favor of the party against whom the
judgment is sought. Here appellant has not even been
afforded the opportunity to submit affidavits, excepting
that referring to the testimony of an engineer if called,
to show the intent of the grantor such as a party does
in a proceeding on a motion for summary judgment,
neither is appellant favored, by this decision, with these
inferences.
The deed here in question furnishes sufficient data
for appellant to be given the opportunity at a hearing
to produce evidence to aid the description. Tiffany on
Real Property cited in our original brief says, the broad
principles hold that a conveyance will not be declared
void for insufficiency in its description of the property
which it purports to convey if it is possible by any reasonable r11le of constr1~ction, aided by extrinsic evidence, to
identify the property. (Italics supplied.)
The case should be remanded to the trial court for
the taking of evidence in aid of the description to show
the intent of the grantor.
Respectfully submitted

B.A.CKMAN, BACI(~IAN and CLARK,
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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